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INTRODUCTION

On March 8, 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
despite the extreme verbal and sexual harassment Harold Wasek
encountered while working on an oil rig in 2008, he could not
bring a Title VII sex discrimination claim against his employer,
2
because he could not prove his aggressor was homosexual.
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services,
Inc. in many ways represents the growing confusion surrounding
same-sex sexual harassment claims since the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue in the 1998 case Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
3
Services, Inc. In Oncale, the Court held that nothing in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars a claim of same-sex sexual
harassment, so long as the discrimination occurred because of the
4
victim’s sex. This “because of sex” requirement means that the
victim must be “exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
5
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”
In Oncale, the Court laid out three evidentiary routes for proving
6
that same-sex sexual harassment had occurred. Subsequently, the
Sixth Circuit in Wasek interpreted these evidentiary routes as
7
exhaustive. This meant that the harassment alleged by Wasek had
to fall into one of the three categories, or it would not be
8
actionable under Title VII.
Wasek solidified a growing circuit split between the courts on
9
how to interpret the evidentiary routes laid out in Oncale. In many
ways, courts oversimplify same-sex sexual harassment claims by
over-emphasizing certain theories of sexual harassment and underemphasizing other theories of harassment. This over-simplification
is especially evident when courts treat the evidentiary routes from
10
Oncale as exhaustive, rather than merely illustrative.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 2012).
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 80–81.
See Wasek, 682 F.3d at 467–68.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
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This comment first examines the requirements for bringing a
11
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
comment then looks to the history of Title VII for guidance on
12
interpretation of the statute. The development of sexual
harassment as part of Title VII sex discrimination is then examined,
as well as the development of same-sex sexual harassment before
13
and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale. Next, the
14
comment presents the growing circuit split among the courts.
This comment argues that interpreting the evidentiary routes
from Oncale as exhaustive oversimplifies the complicated dilemma
of same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace. The comment
looks to the Oncale decision itself for guidance on how to interpret
both the evidentiary routes and the “because of sex” requirement
15
for Title VII discrimination cases. The comment additionally
argues that interpreting the examples as a rigid formula places too
much emphasis on sexual desire and not enough emphasis on
16
other motivations behind same-sex sexual harassment.
Furthermore, the emphasis on sexual desire leads courts to
improperly use sexual orientation to determine whether conduct
17
occurred “because of sex.” This comment provides some examples
of situations that may not be covered under the three evidentiary
18
routes but clearly constitute sexual harassment under Title VII.
Finally, the author advocates for system-wide changes that reflect
19
the complexities of sexual harassment. These changes will allow
plaintiffs to bring same-sex sexual harassment claims despite the
fact that their harassment cases may fall outside of the traditional
categories of sexual harassment.
II. BRINGING A CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII
According to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is
illegal for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.A–B.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part V.D.
See infra Part V.E.
See infra Part V.F.
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respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
20
or national origin.” An employer can be held liable for sexual
harassment under Title VII when submission to sexual harassment
is required as a term of employment, when submission to or
rejection of an instance of sexual harassment is used to make
employment decisions, or when the sexual harassment has created
21
an abusive or hostile work environment.
Although not expressly mentioned in Title VII, sexual
discrimination can include claims of sexual harassment, such as
“[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
22
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” What
differentiates sexual harassment from other forms of discrimination, which tend to be rooted in prejudice or hatred, is that
sexual harassment may also be motivated by sexual desire or
23
attraction.
Critical to the sexual harassment analysis is the requirement
that the discrimination occurred because of sex. This means the
individual on the receiving end of the harassment must prove that
he or she faced “‘disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex [were] not
24
exposed.’”
Furthermore, an employee may bring a sexual harassment
claim based on sexual discrimination that has created a hostile or
25
abusive working environment.
To bring a hostile work
environment claim, one must prove not only that the harassment
occurred because of sex, but also that the harassment was

20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
21. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (2013).
22. Id.
23. See Marianne C. DelPo, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Same Sex
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (citing
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998)) (“Illegal sexual
harassment may occur . . . regardless of whether the harasser is motivated by desire
or hatred.”).
24. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
25. Jeanne-Marie Bates, Feminist Methodology: Influencing Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment Claims, 15 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 143, 145–46 (1994).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/12

4

Vohs: I Don't Know the Question, But Sex Is Definitely the Answer: The

2014]

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

1615

unwelcome, adequately pervasive or severe, and that there exists
26
some basis for imputing liability to an employer.
III. HISTORY OF TITLE VII
A.

Inclusion of Sex Discrimination

Enacted in 1964, Title VII was originally designed to eliminate
27
employment barriers for minorities. The legislative intent behind
28
adding an amendment for discrimination based on sex is unclear.
Opposition to the Civil Rights Act primarily came from two
different groups: conservatives who believed federal intervention
into the private sphere was inappropriate, and Southern supporters
29
of the “region’s segregated racial patterns.”
Proponents of the bill were thus skeptical when Democratic
Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, a longtime critic of the
civil rights movement, proposed amending the Act to include
30
discrimination on the basis of sex. Certain proponents of the Civil
Rights Act, such as chief sponsor of the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Edith Green, believed that discrimination against black Americans
31
was more severe than discrimination against women.
Furthermore, they believed that Smith’s actual motive behind
introducing the sex discrimination amendment was to defeat the
32
bill. For example, scholars note how the debate surrounding the
33
amendment initially included little more than sarcastic remarks.
At that time, the desire to protect women from harsh work

26. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903–04
(11th Cir. 1982).
27. See 3 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 6:1 (2012).
28. See AUGUST B. COCHRAN III, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE LAW: THE
MECHELLE VINSON CASE 19–21 (2004).
29. Id. at 19.
30. Id. at 19–20.
31. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972, at 136 (1990).
32. See id.; see also COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 20.
33. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 31 (Howard Smith stated, “This bill is so
imperfect . . . what harm will this little amendment do?”).
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environments was thought to justify treating men and women
34
differently in the workplace.
To the surprise of skeptics, however, Representative Smith had
35
been a long-time supporter of women’s rights. Smith’s true
intentions in introducing the amendment may be irrelevant,
however, because many female legislators who legitimately
supported the amendment took an active role in the debate after
36
Smith’s introduction. With the support of those female Congress
members and other women’s rights groups, the amendment was
passed by the House, along with the rest of the Civil Rights Act of
37
1964, with the final vote totaling 290 to 130.
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the involved motives,
legal scholars have experienced difficulties determining the
legislative intent of the sex discrimination aspects of Title VII,
which, in combination with the ambiguity of the plain meaning of
38
the statute, may explain why various courts have interpreted the
39
statute differently.
B.

Inclusion of Sexual Harassment Based on Hostile Work Environment

Sexual harassment is not expressly mentioned in Title VII of
40
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In fact, the term was not coined until
1974 during a consciousness-raising event organized by Lin Farley
41
at Cornell University. However, over the years, the Equal

34. See COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 19–20.
35. GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 136 (noting Smith’s support of the Equal
Rights Amendment and his political ties to the National Women’s Party). The
National Women’s Party was a largely white, middle-class organization, which may
explain Smith’s support. See COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 21.
36. COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 20. Martha Griffiths, a female representative
from Michigan, pointed out the danger of not including the amendment when
she said, “You are going to have white men in one bracket, you are going to try to
take colored men and colored women and give them equal employment rights,
and down at the bottom of the list is going to be a white woman with no rights at
all.” GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 137.
37. COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 21.
38. See infra Part V.B.
39. See 3 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 27, § 6:1.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
41. Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 8 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2004).
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) began to recognize
42
sex discrimination as encompassing sexual harassment. This shift
was largely influenced by a book published in 1979 by legal scholar
Catharine MacKinnon entitled Sexual Harassment of Working
43
Women. According to MacKinnon, sexual harassment “undercuts
women’s potential for social equality in two interpenetrated ways:
by using her employment position to coerce her sexually, while
44
using her sexual position to coerce her economically.” To
MacKinnon, sexual harassment was thus sexual discrimination
because it was used as a tool for maintaining male power and
45
privilege over women.
46
Barnes v. Train is considered to be the first sexual harassment
47
case brought in federal court. The plaintiff, Ms. Barnes, claimed
her employer engaged in sexual discrimination when she was
reassigned and her former position was abolished after she refused
48
to engage in sexual relations with her boss. The district court held
that what happened to Ms. Barnes did not fall under Title VII due
to the fact that the alleged retaliation from her employer occurred
“not because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage
49
in a sexual affair with her supervisor.” The district court therefore
50
granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes’ employers.
51
Barnes filed an appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that
Barnes was in fact discriminated against based on her gender and
that “[b]ut for her womanhood . . . her participation in sexual
52
activity would never have been solicited.”

42. See 52 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 2 (1999).
43. COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 49.
44. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE FOR SEX DISCRIMINATION 7 (1979).
45. COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 49.
46. No. 1828-73, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974).
47. COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 51.
48. Barnes, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *1.
49. Id. at *3.
50. Id. at *5.
51. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
52. Id. at 990.
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Nearly a decade later, in 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in the
53
landmark case Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson for the first time
that an employee can bring a sex discrimination case under Title
VII for sexual harassment that created a hostile work
54
environment. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that
Congress intended Title VII to apply only to “tangible” or
“economic” discrimination and concluded that “the phrase ‘terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional
intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
55
men and women in employment.”
C.

Inclusion of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment

Although Congress’ initial purpose in enacting Title VII was to
56
protect women, the Supreme Court, in Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, stated that the protection against
discrimination provided by Title VII extends to male as well as
57
female employees. Since Newport expanded the definition of who
is protected under Title VII, a circuit split began to develop over
58
whether Title VII also extends to same-sex sexual harassment.
53. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
54. Id. at 66.
55. Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing L.A.
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)); see also
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); Rosenfeld v. S. Pac.
Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971) (“[I]t is evident that this prohibition,
along with other statutes such as the Equal Pay Act of 1963 . . . was enacted
primarily to protect women against discrimination in the marketplace and to open
employment opportunities for women in occupations that had traditionally been
closed to them.”).
57. 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983).
58. Certain circuits held that same-sex sexual harassment was never
actionable, some held that same-sex sexual harassment was always actionable, and
some held that same-sex harassment was only actionable if the harasser was
homosexual. Compare Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533, 1993 WL 529956, at *1
(5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993) (holding that harassment by a male supervisor against a
male subordinate could never amount to a claim under Title VII), with Doe ex rel
Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 573 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding Congress’
language makes it clear “that anyone sexually harassed can pursue a claim under
Title VII, no matter what her gender or that of her harasser”), and McWilliams v.
Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195–96 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that heterosexual-on-heterosexual sexual harassment could never qualify as
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The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in 1998 in Oncale
59
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. The petitioner, Joseph Oncale,
worked for respondent Sundowner Offshore Services on an oil
platform in the Gulf of Mexico. While working on the platform,
Oncale was subject to sex-related humiliation and physical assault
60
of a sexual nature. Additionally, he was threatened with rape by
61
his male coworkers. Oncale eventually quit his job due to the
harassment and filed a Title VII complaint with the United States
62
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Both the
district court and the Fifth Circuit held that no cause of action
63
existed for male-on-male sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision with only one
concurrence by Justice Thomas, held that nothing in the language
of the statute or the Court’s precedents prohibited claims based on
64
same-sex discrimination. However, the Court stated, “We have
never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between
men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex
merely because the words used have sexual content or
65
connotations.” Thus, the Court made clear that Title VII
discrimination must have occurred because of the victim’s sex.
Furthermore, the Court in Oncale held that although sexual
desire may provide a motive for sexual harassment, sexual desire is
66
not a necessary motive to support a claim of sex discrimination.
Justice Scalia then listed three examples in which same-sex sexual
harassment would be actionable under Title VII. The first situation
is the one described above, where an employee or supervisor makes
67
a sexual pass at a coworker based on sexual desire. The second
situation occurs when a harasser is motivated by general hostility
68
toward the presence of a certain gender in the workplace. For
discrimination under Title VII because it was not motivated by the “the victim’s
sex”).
59. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
60. Id. at 77.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 79.
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 12

1620

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:4

example, a woman may discriminate against a female coworker
69
based on a belief that women do not belong in that area of work.
Finally, the third example occurs when an employee is treated
differently from employees of the opposite gender in a mixed70
gender workplace.
The Court additionally emphasized that courts must judge
each case based on a consideration of “all the circumstances”
71
surrounding the case. For example, if conduct is “not severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
72
environment,” the conduct is “beyond Title VII’s purview.” After
the Supreme Court decided Oncale, a number of same-sex sexual
harassment cases arose which presented new questions for courts to
73
consider.

69. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co. posits an additional example of a male
doctor who believes that men should not be employed as nurses and who
therefore may harass a coworker who is a male nurse. 260 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir.
2001).
70. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81.
71. Id. at 81 (“In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires
careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and
is experienced by its target.”); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
FACT SHEET: SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1 (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/publications/upload/fs-sex.pdf (stating that allegations must be determined on a case-by-case basis).
72. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
73. In addition, Oncale opened the door to some high-profile settlements.
Larry Keller, Same-Sex Harassment Not Always About Sex, HUMAN RESOURCE
EXECUTIVE ONLINE (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story
.jhtml?id= 534356256. For example, in August 1999, the EEOC settled a lawsuit
against Long Prairie Packing Company, a meat packing plant in Long Prairie,
Minnesota, for $1.9 million. In 2000, the EEOC settled a lawsuit against one of
Colorado’s top auto dealerships, Burt Chevrolet and LGC Management, for
$500,000. Joseph H. Mitchell, the attorney responsible for prosecuting the
Colorado case, stated, “If such blatant discriminatory action was directed toward
female workers, there would be no disagreement over whether it was sexual
harassment. But because it happened to men, management was initially
indifferent to the situation.” Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, EEOC Settles Same-Sex Harassment Suit for a Half Million Dollars
Against Major Colorado Auto Dealership (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom /release/8-4-00.cfm.
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IV. EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although Oncale resolved some questions regarding same-sex
sexual harassment, the Court’s opinion caused a further circuit
split over whether the three examples of same-sex harassment
74
provided by the Court constitute an exhaustive list.
A.

Narrow Reading of Oncale

At least one circuit court has held that the list provided in
75
Oncale is exhaustive. In this interpretation, a plaintiff must allege
that the harasser was either motivated by a homosexual sexual
desire, was acting with a general hostility toward the victim’s sex, or
76
was treating men and women differently in the workplace. If the
harassment does not fit into one of these categories, then the Title
77
VII claim is dismissed.
In Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services, Inc., Harold Wasek worked on
78
an oil rig with an all-male crew. One of his fellow crew members,
79
Paul Ottobre, started harassing Wasek by sexually touching him
80
and making sexual comments toward him. Wasek, frustrated that
81
no one would intervene on his behalf, left the oil rig. Wasek then

74. The Sixth Circuit has explicitly ruled that the three examples listed in
Oncale are exhaustive, while other circuits have ruled that the list from Oncale is
nonexhaustive. Additionally, some circuits have recognized the circuit split but
have declined to rule on the matter. Compare Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc.,
682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Oncale list is exhaustive), with Bibby,
260 F.3d at 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the Oncale list is nonexhaustive), and
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999) (same), and James v.
Platte River Steel Co., 113 F. App’x 864 (10th Cir. 2004) (same), and Barrows v.
Seneca Foods Corp., 512 F. App’x 115 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining to answer whether
the evidentiary routes were exhaustive).
75. See Wasek, 682 F.3d 467–68.
76. Id.; see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
77. Wasek, 682 F.3d at 468.
78. Id. at 465.
79. Ottobre grabbed his buttocks and poked his rear on multiple occasions
with a hammer handle and a long sucker rod. Id.
80. Ottobre told Wasek he had a “pretty mouth,” “pretty lips,” and “you know
you like it sweetheart.” Id. Ottobre also called Wasek and left him a voicemail on
one occasion, stating, “I miss holding you. I miss spooning with you. I love you.
Please call me back.” Id. at 466.
81. Id.
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brought a Title VII sexual harassment claim against Arrow Energy.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Arrow
83
Energy, and Wasek appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit emphasized that although same-sex sexual
harassment is just as actionable as different-sex sexual harassment,
“Title VII is not ‘a general civility code for the American
84
workplace.’” The court cautioned that unless there exists an
additional element of discrimination, mere bullying is not
85
actionable under Title VII.
The Sixth Circuit then analyzed the conduct of Ottobre under
86
the three situations provided in Oncale. Because only men worked
at the oil rig, the court ruled that the last two categories (general
hostility towards men and comparative treatment between opposite
87
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace) could not apply to this case. This
left only the first category available to Wasek—sexual harassment
88
based on sexual desire. The court stated that “in order to infer
discrimination, Wasek must demonstrate that Ottobre was
89
homosexual.”
Oncale requires “credible evidence” of a harasser’s sexual
90
orientation. The only evidence in the record concerning
Ottobre’s sexual orientation was a statement from Wasek in his
91
deposition. Wasek stated in the deposition that he thought
92
Ottobre was “a little strange” and “possibly bisexual.” The court
ruled that a single speculative statement was insufficient to infer a
person’s sexual orientation, and because Wasek was unable to
prove that Ottobre was gay or bisexual, the court dismissed the
93
claim.

82.
83.
84.
(1998)).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
(1998)).
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 467.
Id.
Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
Id.
Id. at 467–68.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
Id.
Id.
Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/12

12

Vohs: I Don't Know the Question, But Sex Is Definitely the Answer: The

2014]

B.

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

1623

Broad Readings of Oncale

Unlike Wasek, some circuits have addressed the issue and
decided that the list from Oncale is merely illustrative and therefore
nonexhaustive. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in Shepherd v.
Slater Steels Corp., stated “we discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s
decision indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be
94
exhaustive rather than instructive.” The Third and Tenth Circuits
95
came to similar conclusions.
In EEOC v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., the Fifth Circuit
addressed a case where a male construction worker was subjected
to sexually vulgar language on a construction site by a male
96
coworker. In this case, the plaintiff argued that he was harassed
97
because he did not conform to the male stereotype. The plaintiff
argued that his use of “Wet Ones” instead of toilet paper was
perceived as not conforming to masculine gender norms, which led
98
to his harassment. The court held that the plaintiff’s use of “Wet
Ones” was insufficient to constitute nonconformance to a male
99
stereotype, but did not answer whether nonconformance to
gender stereotypes, a theory outside the three situations
enumerated in Oncale, was a viable theory of Title VII
100
discrimination.

94. 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999).
95. See James v. Platte River Steel Co., 113 F. App’x 864, 867 (10th Cir. 2004)
(noting that the plaintiff was not limited by the evidentiary routes as laid out in
Oncale, but ultimately concluding that the plaintiff failed to show he was harassed
“due to the fact that he failed to conform to gender stereotypes”); Bibby v. Phila.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying the plaintiff
Title VII relief because he could not prove his discrimination occurred because of
sex, but noting that “[b]ased on the facts of a particular case and the creativity of
the parties, other ways in which to prove that harassment occurred because of sex
may be available”).
96. 689 F.3d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir.
2013).
97. Id. at 461.
98. Id. at 462.
99. Id.
100. Id. (“Because there is insufficient evidence in this case to support the
asserted sex stereotyping theory of same-sex harassment asserted by the EEOC, we
need not decide whether such a theory is cognizable in this circuit.”).
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However, the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and
101
came to another decision on September 27, 2013. In the second
opinion, the Fifth Circuit expressly ruled that a plaintiff can bring a
same-sex sexual harassment claim for harassment on the basis of
102
gender stereotyping. Furthermore, this time around, the Fifth
Circuit decided to rule on the question of the exclusivity of the
evidentiary routes from Oncale and held that the evidentiary routes
103
are “illustrative, not exhaustive, in nature.”
Other circuits have also accepted the sex-stereotype theory of
same-sex discrimination. For example, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant
Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit allowed a male employee to bring a
Title VII claim against his employer after he claimed male
104
coworkers verbally harassed him for being too effeminate.
Without mentioning the three scenarios listed in Oncale, the court
stated that verbal abuse based upon perceptions of gender
nonconformity equate to discrimination because of sex, making
105
such claims actionable under Title VII.
C.

Ambiguous Readings of Oncale

Some courts have addressed the growing circuit split but have
declined to rule on the issue. For example, the Second Circuit, in
Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., ruled that the aggressor treated
women better than men under the third category of direct
comparative evidence, concerning how members of both sexes are
106
treated in a mixed-gender workplace. In a footnote to the case,
the court stated that:
We have not definitively resolved whether these three
categories from Oncale were meant to establish an

101. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
102. Id. at 454. The Court relied on the holding in Oncale as well as the
Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989),
holding that different-sex gender-stereotyping was an actionable claim under Title
VII. The Fifth Circuit stated that “nothing in Oncale overturns or otherwise upsets
the Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse,” and the ability to bring a claim based on
gender stereotypes extends to same-sex harassment. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d
at 456.
103. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 455.
104. 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
105. Id. at 874.
106. 512 F. App'x 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2013).
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exclusive list or merely provide representative examples.
Although we note that the Supreme Court explicitly used
the phrase “for example” when discussing these potential
“evidentiary route[s],” we need not resolve the issue
because reversal is warranted under one of the three
107
Oncale categories.
Furthermore, many courts do not apply their holdings in a
consistent manner. On rehearing en banc in Boh Brothers
Construction Co., the Fifth Circuit noted that “[e]very circuit to
squarely consider the issue has held that the Oncale categories are
108
illustrative, not exhaustive, in nature.” While it is true that many
courts have expressly noted the nonexhaustive nature of the Oncale
list, a growing trend has emerged in which courts acknowledge the
list as nonexhaustive but then treat the list as exhaustive in
109
practice.
110
Boh Brothers gives the example of Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2
as a case in which the Eighth Circuit expressly accepted the Oncale
111
list as nonexhaustive. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit stated that “the
Supreme Court set forth a non-exhaustive list that included three
possible evidentiary routes same-sex harassment plaintiffs may
112
follow to show that harassment was based on sex.” The ambiguity
107. Id. at 117 n.3 (citation omitted).
108. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 455.
109. See, e.g., id. at 455 n.6.
[W]e note that the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the availability of an
evidentiary route not articulated in Oncale in 2006. See Vickers v.
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763–65 (6th Cir. 2006). In a
subsequent case, the Sixth Circuit noted that Oncale offered “guidance”
regarding the manner in which a plaintiff can prove same-sex
harassment. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 467–68
(6th Cir. 2012). Although the court arguably treated the Oncale
categories as if they were exclusive in Wasek, it did not expressly
consider the issue because the plaintiff's claim fell into Oncale's first
category.
Id.
110. 397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005).
111. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 455 n.6.
112. Pedroza, 397 F.3d at 1068 (emphasis added). The court additionally
interpreted the first category more broadly than other courts, noting that the
requirement is that the harasser acted out of sexual desire, not that the harasser
was homosexual. Id. at 1069 n.2 (“We disagree with . . . the inferences that may
flow from the facts that [the female harasser] had children and had been in a
long-term relationship with a man. These facts tend to prove only that [the
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arises because, despite that holding, the Eighth Circuit continued
to use the Oncale list as a checklist for determining whether the
113
conduct occurred “because of sex.”
The inconsistent application of the Oncale decision, in
combination with the complicated nature of gender dynamics in
the workplace, has caused a major gap to develop in same-sex
sexual harassment, leaving legitimate victims of sexual harassment
unable to bring Title VII claims.
V. ARGUMENT
In Oncale, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he critical issue,
Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
114
which members of the other sex are not exposed.” Limiting samesex Title VII claims to the three situations enumerated in Oncale
115
was not the intention of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, a rigid
view of Title VII claims is incompatible with both the history of
Title VII and society’s growing understanding of gender dynamics
116
in the workplace.
Courts should thus divorce their ties to
inflexible theories of sexual harassment and should view both the
“because of sex” requirement and the evidentiary routes from
Oncale broadly.

harasser] was not strictly homosexual. They do not preclude a jury from finding
that [the harasser] was motivated by some degree of homosexual desire . . . .”).
113. See, e.g., Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2010). The
court in Smith held that there was no evidence that the aggressor was particularly
attracted to the sexual harassment victim. Id. at 908. Similarly, the court rejected
the last two evidentiary routes because it ruled that the aggressor treated both
male and female employees “in the same vulgar and inappropriate way.” Id. The
court thus concluded that the plaintiff had not proved discrimination on the basis
of sex and upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Id.; see also
McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543–44 (8th Cir. 2003)
(denying a same-sex sexual harassment claim because the inappropriate conduct
did not fit into one of the Oncale categories).
114. 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
115. See infra Part V.A.
116. See supra Part III.
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Looking to the Oncale Decision for Direction

It is not difficult to see why many courts have struggled with
interpreting the Oncale decision. On one hand, the Supreme Court,
through Justice Scalia’s opinion, provided clarity to lower courts as
it opened the door for a broader view of sex discrimination claims
by holding that individuals can bring same-sex sexual harassment
117
claims under Title VII. On the other hand, as this article later
notes, the opinion also left certain crucial interpretive questions
118
unanswered.
The Oncale decision, however, provides some guidance on the
proper interpretation of Title VII. Justice Scalia emphasized how
the kind of discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes “sexual
119
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.”
Thus, the true test of whether conduct qualifies as sexual
discrimination is found in the statute itself. Rather than asking
whether the conduct in question is analogous to any of the
evidentiary routes listed in Oncale, courts should instead look to
Title VII and ask whether conduct occurred because of the victim’s
120
sex. The Seventh Circuit emphasized this point in Shepherd v.
121
Slater Steels Corp. In Shepherd, the court stated, “The Court’s focus
[in Oncale] was on what the plaintiff must ultimately prove rather
117. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
118. See infra Part V.B.
119. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The statute states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The relevant requirement listed
in the statute is that the harassment occurred “because of such individual’s . . .
sex.” Id.
120. Confusion over the interpretation of Oncale, however, arises from the fact
that the Court in Oncale provides little guidance on what Congress meant when it
determined that discrimination must be “because of sex.” See infra Part V.B.
121. 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999).
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122

than the methods of doing so.” What the plaintiff must prove is
whether the discrimination occurred because of sex. The examples
listed in Oncale are simply methods of proving that conduct occurred
123
because of sex.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia explicitly refers to the three
124
evidentiary routes as examples. This particular choice of words
signals the Court’s intention that the situations given were meant to
be illustrative. If the Court had intended to give a rigid formula for
determining whether conduct was sex discrimination, it could have
made that intention clear by stating that there are only three
methods of proving same-sex sexual harassment.
Additionally, the Court stated how “[t]he real social impact of
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are
not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the
125
physical acts performed.” The Court here acknowledged how
complicated sexual harassment cases can be. It therefore seems
unlikely that the Court would then prescribe a fairly simple threepart test for conclusively deciding whether conduct constitutes
same-sex sexual harassment.
B.

What Constitutes Behavior “Because of Sex?”

Part of the reason courts have taken such varied approaches
after Oncale is that Oncale did little to clarify what kind of conduct
actually is actionable under Title VII. Justice Scalia confirmed
that “[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow,
122. Id. at 1009.
123. To emphasize this point, the Shepherd court noted that discrimination
should not be determined by a rigid formula. Id. (citing O'Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–13 (1996); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
124. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (“[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier
of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it
clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women
in the workplace.” (emphasis added)); see also Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp.,
512 F. App'x 115, 117 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining to comment on whether the
evidentiary routes in Oncale are exhaustive, but taking note of the Court’s explicit
use of the phrase “for example”).
125. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82.
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he or she must always prove that the conduct . . . constituted
126
‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’” Yet, neither Title VII nor
127
Oncale defines “sex.”
According to Merriam-Webster, “sex” is first defined as “either
of the two major forms of individuals that occur in many species
and that are distinguished respectively as female or male
esp[ecially] on the basis of their reproductive organs and
128
Under this definition, the “because of sex”
structures.”
requirement is satisfied when a person is discriminated against
129
because he or she is biologically male or female.
Merriam-Webster also defines “sex” as “sexually motivated
130
phenomena or behavior” or “genitalia.” Under these definitions,
“because of sex” would encompass all behavior motivated by sexual
131
desire.
Current dictionaries typically do not, however, define “sex” as
including cultural, psychological, or behavioral traits, as these are
132
now known as constituting “gender” rather than sex. However, in
1961, three years before Title VII was passed, Merriam-Webster
included “[t]he sphere of behavior dominated by the relations
133
between male and female” as an additional definition of “sex.”

126. Id. at 81.
127. With no definition and with little legislative history surrounding Title VII,
“the jurisprudence defining the parameters of a cause of action under Title VII
has evolved with little legislative guidance on the question of when the challenged
conduct occurs ‘because of’ a person's ‘sex.’” Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne,
Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of Heterosexual “Horseplay”: Same Sex Sexual
Harassment, Workplace Gender Hierarchies, and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before
and After Oncale, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 162 (1999).
128. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1140 (11th ed. 2003).
129. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Theories of Harassment “Because of Sex,” in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 41, at 155, 157.
130. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 128, at 1140.
131. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 129, at 157.
132. Compare MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 128,
at 520 (“Gender”), and THE NEW AMERICAN OXFORD DICTIONARY 700 (2nd ed.
2005) (same), with MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 128
(“Sex”), and THE NEW AMERICAN OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra, at 1553 (same). See
generally FOWLER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE (3d. ed. 2004) (“Since the 1960s this
secondary sense [of sex] has come into much more frequent use, especially among
feminists, with the intention ‘of emphasizing the social and cultural, as opposed to
the biological, distinctions between the sexes.’”).
133. Eskridge, J.R., supra note 129.
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Indeed, courts have regularly recognized gender-based discrimi134
nation as actionable under Title VII.
C.

Sexual Desire Often Is Not the True Motive Behind Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment

If the three evidentiary routes enumerated in Oncale are
thought of as exhaustive, cases may arise, such as Wasek, in which
the only way to prove sexual harassment is through proof of the
135
aggressor’s sexual desire or homosexuality.
Viewing sexual
harassment only in terms of sexual desire, however, vastly simplifies
the power and gender dynamics that often exist behind the acts of
sexual harassment. In fact, Justice Scalia said as much in the Oncale
136
opinion.
Some of the most common forms of opposite-sex sexual
harassment are not motivated by sexual desire, but rather are forms
of gender-based harassment “designed to maintain work . . . as
137
bastions of masculine competence and authority.” The EEOC
134. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 164–65 (“[T]he courts, implicitly
recognizing that a person's gender is integrally related [to] that person's sex as it is
perceived by others, have characterized such gender-based conduct as sex-based
conduct within the purview of Title VII.”); see also, e.g., Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that discrimination based on the plaintiff’s
lack of femininity was actionable).
135. See Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“Wasek’s evidence can only fit into the first of these three routes. No evidence
exists that Ottobre was motivated by a general hostility towards men. And the oil
rig was not a mixed-sex workplace, so there is no possibility of comparative
evidence. Thus, in order to infer discrimination, Wasek must demonstrate that
Ottobre was homosexual.”).
136. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(“[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.”).
137. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687
(1998). According to Schultz,
The forms of such harassment are wide-ranging. They include
characterizing the work as appropriate for men only; denigrating
women’s performance or ability to master the job; providing
patronizing forms of help in performing the job; withholding the
training, information, or opportunity to learn to do the job well;
engaging in deliberate work sabotage; providing sexist evaluations of
women’s performance or denying them deserved promotions; isolating
women from the social networks that confer a sense of belonging;
denying women the perks or privileges that are required for success;
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compliance manuals and guidelines confirm that “sex-based
harassment—that is, harassment not involving sexual activity or
language—may also give rise to Title VII liability (just as in the case
of harassment based on race, national origin or religion) if it is
‘sufficiently patterned or pervasive’ and directed at employees
138
because of their sex.”
The Supreme Court expressed this understanding for
opposite-sex sexual harassment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., a
case in which the plaintiff, Teresa Harris, was verbally insulted
because of her gender and targeted through sexual innuendo
139
jokes. The president of Forklift Systems often made derogatory
comments toward Harris, including, “You’re a woman, what do you
140
know” and “We need a man as the rental manager.”
Harris presented a different spin on the traditional view of
141
sexual harassment as “economically leveraged sexual coercion.”
This case was not about sexual desire. In fact, it was about the
142
opposite of sexual desire. In these kinds of cases, men are not
assigning women sex-stereotyped service tasks that lie outside their job
descriptions (such as cleaning or serving coffee); engaging in taunting,
pranks, and other forms of hazing designed to remind women that
they are different and out of place; and physically assaulting or
threatening to assault the women who dare to fight back. Of course,
making a woman the object of sexual attention can also work to
undermine her image and self-confidence as a capable worker. Yet,
much of the time, harassment assumes a form that has little or nothing
to do with sexuality but everything to do with gender.
Id.
138. Id. at 1732 n.246 (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.6, ¶ 3105,
at 3217 (Jan. 1982); EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at E-1 (Mar. 28, 1990)).
139. 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
140. Id.
141. Siegel, supra note 41, at 22; see also McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“We have never held that sexual harassment . . . must, to be
illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other incidents with
clearly sexual overtones. . . . Rather, we hold that any harassment or other unequal
treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the
sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive,
comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title VII.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Stevens v. Dep’t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991).
142. See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1721 (2002) (stating that in Harris,
“the harassers’ motivation was to humiliate a woman co-worker” and there was no
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using their power to coerce women sexually; rather, they are using
“sexualized and nonsexualized conduct to communicate to women
143
their outsider status in the workplace.”
For example, courts have held that certain gender-based and
sexist epithets constitute sex-based discrimination under Title
144
VII. Additionally, physical aggression, violence, and verbal abuse
without sexual overtones may constitute harassment based on
145
sex.
Some scholars believe that this communication of outsider
status translates equally to same-sex sexual harassment. For
example, Reva B. Siegel expressed the following interpretation of
Oncale:
Suppose the men harassing Oncale are straight. The malemale harassment in Oncale could well be assimilated to the
male-female harassment in Harris. On this view, Oncale’s
harassers would be deploying sexualized conduct to
gender-mark work roles, even though no women are on
the scene—in some important sense to ensure that no
146
women ever appear on the scene.
The more society learns about the hierarchical structure of the
workplace, the more society has realized that sexual harassment, or
147
sexual abuse in general, is not about sex but instead about power.
evidence that the harasser acted out of sexual desire for the plaintiff).
143. Siegel, supra note 41, at 22.
144. See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that the words “curb side cunt” “bitch” and “floor whore” were
sufficient to constitute Title VII harassment); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc.,
842 F.2d 1010, 1012, 1014–15 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the words “fucking flag
girls,” “cavern cunt,” and “blond bitch,” in combination with other forms of
harassment, was severe and pervasive enough to constitute Title VII sex
discrimination); Hellebusch v. City of Wentzville, No. 4:95CV1533 JCH, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20828, at *5–6, *18 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 1996) (plaintiff called “fucking
bitch,” “fucking cunt,” and “fucking whore”).
145. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 188 (citing Quick v. Donaldson
Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a district court was incorrect
for concluding that harassment could not be gender-based if motivated by enmity
or hooliganism)).
146. Siegel, supra note 41, at 25.
147. Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 471814 (citing MICHAEL
SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 35 (1997))
(drawing attention to a collection of studies that show how the hierarchies of all-
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In an amicus brief for the Oncale case, Catherine MacKinnon
noted that “[m]en are most often raped by other men when there
are no women around: in prisons, in confined and isolated work
sites, in men’s schools and colleges, in the military, in athletics, in
148
fraternities.” These men are still victimized because of their sex,
149
because they are being made to feel inferior as men.
As
MacKinnon makes clear, this diminishment of masculinity “cannot
be done to a woman. What he loses, he loses through gender, as a
150
man.”
For MacKinnon and other legal scholars who follow this line of
reasoning, the sexual act itself is enough to constitute sex-based
151
discrimination. The logic behind this argument is that the act of
sexual harassment is an act which asserts male dominance; it thus
does not matter whether the actor was male or female—all that
152
matters is that the act asserted sexual dominance. This argument
153
looks to the effect of the rape or sexual harassment, not the motive.
One can look to the Wasek case as an example of a situation
where sexual acts were used to enforce power dynamics. In that
case, the aggressor, Ottobre, used sexualized language and actions
154
toward Wasek. The abuse escalated after Wasek struggled with
155
heavy equipment. Furthermore, Ottobre was enabled to continue
the abuse through the encouragement of other men in Arrow
Energy’s male-dominated workplace, including Wasek’s supervisor,

male environments often lead to sexual abuse, motivated by competition, violence
as a rite of passage, and more).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 10.
151. Id. at 4 (“Other legal requisites being met, if acts are sexual and hurt one
sex, they are sex-based, regardless of the gender and sexual orientation of the
parties.”).
152. Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 600 (2013).
153. Id. (citing SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND
RAPE 15, 105 (1975)) (“Whatever the motive, the effect of rape is to maintain male
supremacy, just as lynching maintained white supremacy. Sexual harassment is not
stripped of its meaning as an act of male supremacy when the harassers are of the
same sex, just as lynching would not escape its historical connotation as a
technology of racial supremacy if it were done by and to people of the same
race.”).
154. See supra Part IV.A.
155. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2012).
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Pat Tripp, who laughed at Wasek instead of intervening. In fact,
Tripp told Wasek he would be punished if he reported the abuse to
157
the director of operations. Instead of attempting to put an end to
158
the abuse, Tripp told Wasek to stop whining. Additionally, Wasek
was encouraged to solve the problem by using physical violence
159
against Ottobre.
One could argue that what happened in Wasek was a systematic
imposition of power against someone who was viewed as weaker
than the other men on the job. Because Wasek was a man, he was
expected to take the abuse and to stop whining. Because he was a
man, he was encouraged to fight back with violence if he had a
problem with the abuse. One could thus argue that even though
sexual desire did not motivate Wasek’s harassment, Wasek was still
harassed because of his sex.
D.

Difficulties with Proving the Aggressor’s Sexual Desire or Orientation

Unlike same-sex sexual harassment, when a harasser and his or
her victim are of opposite sexes,
there is a reasonable inference that the harasser is acting
because of the victim’s sex. . . . Thus, when a heterosexual
man makes implicit or explicit proposals of sexual activity
to a woman coworker or subordinate, it is easy to
conclude or at least infer that the behavior is motivated by
160
her sex.
This inference is not necessarily presumed in cases of same-sex sexual
161
harassment, however. It is sometimes difficult, if not impossible,
156. Id.
157. Id. When Wasek did report the abuse to the director of operations, the
Michigan director of operations responded by asking Wasek, “Why don't you just
kick [Ottobre's] ass?” Id. at 466.
158. Id. at 465. The Pennsylvania director of operations also “chastise[d]
Wasek for ‘whining.’” Id. at 466.
159. Id.
160. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
80 (1998)); see also Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 164 (“[I]n the opposite-sex
context, courts have readily inferred the requisite sex-based causal nexus from the
nature of the harassment itself when the harassment invokes gender-based
stereotypes or entails sexualized interactions that reinforce and perpetuate gender
hierarchies.”).
161. Bibby, 260 F.3d at 262.
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to determine what precisely motivates sexual harassment. Yet, as
Wasek has made clear, in situations where the workplace is not
mixed-gender, whether or not a Title VII claim survives can depend
163
solely on the aggressor’s sexual desire.
Many courts have used a harasser’s sexual orientation to prove
164
that he or she acted out of sexual desire. In fact, as Wasek
displayed, plaintiffs are sometimes “precluded from recovery unless
they are able to prove to some extent the homosexuality of their
165
harasser.” The tendency to equate sexual desire with sexual
orientation may stem directly from Scalia’s opinion in Oncale. Scalia
states that sexual desire could be inferred “if there were credible

162. For example, Professor of Law Katherine M. Franke is critical of a
Title VII analysis that requires proof that “but for” the victim’s gender, the
offender would not have engaged in the harassment. She states:
[O]ne of the great strengths of Title VII generally, and sexual
harassment jurisprudence specifically, is that it applies to conduct that
has either the purpose or the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex.
Over time, Title VII has proven to be an effective weapon in combating
social attitudes about the relative interests and abilities of men and
women that are not necessarily grounded in animus so much as
outmoded myths and stereotypes. Thus a male boss who interjects
sexual comments and behavior into his working relationship with a
female colleague may be guilty of sexual harassment whether he
naively meant to flatter or invidiously hoped to “get off” on her
presence in the workplace.
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 41, at 169, 173.
163. Wasek, 682 F.3d at 468; see also Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397
F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2005).
164. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80; Wasek, 682 F.3d at 468; Cherry v. Shaw Coastal,
Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 162 (2012); Love v.
Motiva Enters., 349 F. App’x 900, 903 (5th Cir. 2009); La Day v. Catalyst Tech.,
Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2002). Katherine M. Franke notes the problem
with the view that a harasser would not have engaged in the harassment “but for”
the sex of the victim. She states,
[I]n these cases “but for” causation collapses into sexual orientation.
Under this view, a harasser only sexually harasses members of the class
of people that he or she sexually desires. As such, “because of sex,”
primarily means “because of the harasser’s sexual orientation,” and
only secondarily means “because of the victim’s sex.”
Franke, supra note 162, at 173–74.
165. Mary Ann Connell & Donna Euben, Evolving Law in Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 31 J.C. & U.L. 193, 202 (2004).
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evidence that the harasser was homosexual.”
However, a
primarily heterosexual male aggressor may find himself attracted to
a male employee for the first time and act according to that sexual
desire. In this case, there would be no evidence of the aggressor’s
167
homosexuality besides the act committed against his coworker.
Therefore, using a person’s sexual orientation may not be an
accurate indicator of whether an aggressor acted according to
168
sexual desire.
The Eighth Circuit noted this potential problem in Pedroza v.
169
Cintas Corp. No. 2. In Pedroza, a female employee, Terri Pedroza,
was subject to harassment from one of her female coworkers, Pam
170
Straw. The workplace seemed to be exclusively female, and
166. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
167. Arguably, it may be more difficult to prove the sexual orientation of an
individual who identifies as LGBT than a person who does not identify as LGBT.
This is because, historically, LGBT individuals have been encouraged to hide their
sexual preferences due to lack of acceptance in the workplace. See BOB POWERS &
ALAN ELLIS, A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN THE WORKPLACE 5
(1995).
When negative messages or signals are sent, many employees feel
forced to hide their sexual identity. . . .
....
Whenever a manager or coworker tells a homophobic, racist, or
sexist joke, the message is sent that it is not okay to be yourself. Every
time we exclude sexual minorities, we reinforce the message that
sexual minorities are not welcome. Often this is done inadvertently—
for example, in training classes where role plays contain references
only to opposite sex couples or in invitations to office parties in which
husbands and wives are encouraged to attend but no attempt is made
to include same-sex partners. Although seemingly subtle, these acts
reinforce the message that one needs to hide simply to survive.
Id. Therefore, an individual who must prove his or her aggressor’s homosexual
orientation may face evidentiary obstacles that are not faced in different-sex sexual
harassment, because sexual minorities have often been encouraged by their
coworkers and society at large to hide their sexual preferences.
168. See Franke, supra note 162, at 174 (“[A]s a logical matter, this reasoning
works only in a world populated exclusively by Kinsey Ones and Kinsey Sixes, that
is, people who are exclusively heterosexual or exclusively homosexual in their
attractions, desires, and sexual behavior.”).
169. 397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005).
170. Id. at 1066. Straw allegedly attempted to grab Pedroza’s hand, asked
Pedroza, “You want me to kiss you, honey?” and then attempted to kiss Pedroza on
the mouth. Id. Straw told Pedroza she did not have a husband and that “I want
you, honey.” Id. She also rubbed her buttocks several times in an attempt to get
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Pedroza did not argue that Straw was generally hostile toward other
171
women in the workplace. Thus, the court concluded that the only
remaining question was whether Straw’s behavior was motivated by
172
sexual desire. The court noted that Straw had five children from
173
a former marriage and that she lived with a long-term boyfriend.
However, the court also stated that evidence of Straw’s children
and her boyfriend only tended to show “that Straw was not strictly
174
homosexual” and the evidence does “not preclude a jury from
finding that Straw was motivated by some degree of homosexual
175
desire towards Pedroza.”
Another unfortunate result of improperly emphasizing sexual
orientation is that it makes it much easier to bring a Title VII claim
176
against a homosexual coworker. For example, a situation in
which an openly gay employee grabs a coworker’s genitals is much
more likely to result in a successful Title VII claim than a situation
in which a non-openly gay or straight employee grabs a coworker’s
genitals. Both situations concern the same kind of conduct, and a
victim would likely respond the same way to either situation;
however, the claim against the homosexual coworker has a greater
chance of surviving a court’s scrutiny.
E.

Examples of Clear Sex Discrimination Where Adherence to a Rigid
Evidentiary Formula Causes the Claim to Fail.

One of the main problems with interpreting the Oncale list as
exhaustive is that the three categories do not cover every instance
that sexual harassment occurred because of the victim’s sex.
The most common example that courts are beginning to
recognize is where an individual is harassed by his or her coworkers

Pedroza’s attention. Id.
171. Id. at 1068–69.
172. Id. at 1069.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1069 at n.2.
175. Id. But see Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir.
2012) (holding that Wasek’s suspicion that his aggressor was “a little strange,
possibly bisexual” was insufficient to establish the first Oncale category of
harassment motivated by sexual desire).
176. Connell & Euben, supra note 165, at 208 (“[G]ay harassers became target
defendants of Title VII, whereas non-gay men can harass gender nonconforming
men with impunity.”) (quoting Schwartz, supra note 142, at 1763).
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for failing to conform to stereotypical gender roles. This was the
178
situation in EEOC v. Boh Brothers Construction Co. An increasing
number of courts are beginning to recognize that this kind of
harassment is actionable under Title VII due to the fact that the
179
harassment occurs because of the victim’s sex. One could argue

177. In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, who worked at Price
Waterhouse’s Office of Government Services in Washington, D.C., was proposed
for partnership. Id. at 233. However, some of the partners had doubts about her
performance because she was a woman. Id. at 235. She was described by certain
partners as being too “macho” and that she was “overcompensate[ing] for being a
woman.” Id. Additionally, her use of profanity was criticized “because it's a lady
using foul language.” Id. Hopkins was told that she should “walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry.” Id. Hopkins was neither denied nor offered a partnership;
however, she was held for reconsideration the following year. Id. at 233. When the
partners refused to reconsider her the following year, Hopkins brought a Title VII
claim. Id. at 231–32. The Supreme Court ruled that if an employer acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman either should or should not be aggressive, then the
employer has acted on the basis of gender. Id. at 250. The Court stated, “[W]e are
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group . . . .” Id.
at 251. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. was an early case that confirmed
that the rule from Price Waterhouse also applied to man-on-man genderstereotyping. 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999).
Oncale confirms that the standards of liability under Title VII, as they
have been refined and explicated over time, apply to same-sex
plaintiffs just as they do to opposite-sex plaintiffs. In other words, just
as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated
against her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of
femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men
discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped
expectations of masculinity.
Id. (citations omitted).
178. 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013); see supra Part IV.B.
179. See Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 454 (“[N]umerous courts, including
ours, have recognized that a plaintiff can satisfy Title VII’s because-of-sex
requirement with evidence of a plaintiff’s perceived failure to conform to
traditional gender stereotypes.”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir.
2011) (“[D]iscrimination against a transgender individual because of her gendernonconformity is sex discrimination.”); Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C.,
591 F.3d 1033, 1041 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a reasonable fact finder could
find that the plaintiff faced discrimination on the basis of sex when she failed to
meet employment requirements that she be “pretty” and have the “Midwestern girl
look”); Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding
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that Wasek fell into this category based on the harassment Wasek
180
faced for not asserting himself as a dominant male.
Another example that is not necessarily covered in the
evidentiary routes laid out in Oncale is harassment based on a
coworker’s appearance. For example, Schmitz v. ING Securities,
181
Futures & Options, Inc.
presented the opposite of what is
considered a typical sexual harassment case. Instead of a supervisor
harassing an employee because of sexual desire, the male
supervisor in this case harassed Schmitz based on a “criticism of
Schmitz for what he viewed as her flaunting of inappropriately sexy
182
dress and sexy demeanor.” The supervisor never offered sexual
propositions, never asked Schmitz for a date, and never indicated
183
any kind of sexual interest in her. Instead, Schmitz’s supervisor
complained that her attire undermined office productivity because
184
“‘any hot-blooded male’ in the office could be aroused.” He also
told her that “he would never let his wife leave the house dressed as

that a jury could reasonably conclude that sex-based discrimination occurred
when a female employer denied a female employee a promotion based on a belief
that the employee would prioritize being a caregiver to her four young children
over her job); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that verbal abuse based on the perception that a male employee was
effeminate could constitute discrimination “because of sex”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff may be able
to prove that same-sex harassment was discrimination because of sex by presenting
evidence that the harasser's conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did
not conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender.”).
180. See supra Part V.B. Wasek worked on an all-male oil rig. As the National
Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. argues in its amicus brief for the
Oncale case, “all-male environments are frequently characterized by extreme
hierarchy well-documented to breed sexual abuse of men by men.” Brief for
National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., supra note 147,
at 9. Males thus often harass other males who are viewed as less powerful. One
could argue that in this case, Ottobre harassed Wasek because he viewed him as
weak, and because he viewed him as “less” of a man. The author argues that this
amounts to harassment based on Ottobre’s belief that Wasek did not conform to a
stereotypically aggressive and dominant male gender role.
181. 10 F. Supp. 2d 982 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff’d, No. 98-3007, 1999 WL 528024
(7th Cir. July 20, 1999).
182. Id. at 986.
183. Schmitz v. ING Sec., Futures & Options, Inc., No. 98-3007, 1999
WL 528024, at *1 (7th Cir. July 20, 1999).
184. Id.
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185

Schmitz was.” Although the Seventh Circuit denied Schmitz’s
186
sexual harassment claim, the Supreme Court allowed a similar
187
case to succeed in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. In Harris, the
harasser made comments encouraging women employees to dress
to expose their breasts and made other sexual innuendos about the
188
way the plaintiff dressed. Although these cases involved male
criticism of a female coworker, it is easy to imagine a situation in
which a woman harasses another woman based on the second
189
woman’s appearance or clothing choices. Like the assertions of
male dominance common in all-male workplaces, female-on-female
190
harassment may occur because of a perceived threat of power.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *3. The court ruled that the conduct in this case was not severe
enough to amount to harassment. However, this case proves that even differentsex sexual harassment claims can improperly rely on sexual desire. The court
stated that “Schmitz fails to satisfy the first prong because she cannot show that she
was subjected to sexual advances or requests for sexual favors.” Id. However, there
are certainly other methods of proving sexual harassment other than sexual
desire. See Franke, supra note 162, at 175–76 (“Tragically, the Court’s reasoning [in
Oncale] has reinforced the lower courts’ inclination to make sex matter too much
and for the wrong reasons.”).
187. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Arguably, the conduct in Harris was more severe than
the conduct in Schmitz; yet the plaintiff in the Harris case was also subjected to
sexual innuendos based on her dress. Id. at 19.
188. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
(No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 302216.
189. Dr. Peggy Drexler argues that female comments on appearance and
dress have become routine in some workplaces, despite the fact that this behavior
“would be seen more obviously as harassment when coming from a man.” Peggy
Drexler, The Tyranny of the Queen Bee, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2013, at C1, available at
LEXIS.
190. See id. (“Some women—especially in industries that remain maledominated—assume that their perches may be pulled from beneath them at any
given moment . . . . Made to second-guess themselves, they try to ensure their own
dominance by keeping others, especially women, down.”). The Workplace
Bullying Institute, an organization based out of the state of Washington,
conducted a survey in 2010 on workplace bullying. The results of the 2010 survey
show that although bullying is done primarily by men, eighty percent of female
bullies target other women in the office. That number marks an increase of nine
percent from when the study was last conducted in 2007. In general, the results of
the study show that in thirty-four percent of workplace bullying incidents, the bully
is male and the target is male. In thirty-percent of those incidents, the bully is
female and the target is female. Thus, female-on-female bullying is a growing issue
in the workplace. Gender & Workplace Bullying: 2010 WBI Survey, WORKPLACE
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However, harassment based on appearance will not always fit into
191
one of the three Oncale categories.
Furthermore, the Oncale categories do not necessarily include
situations in which there is sexual action, but no motive of sexual
desire; yet this kind of harassment is regularly regarded as sexual
192
harassment when perpetrated by a member of the opposite sex.
For example, in Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit held that “[r]ape is unquestionably among the most severe
forms of sexual harassment. . . . Being raped is, at minimum, an act
193
of discrimination based on sex.” The Oncale categories look to the
motive behind the sexual harassment rather than the harassment
itself, meaning an instance of sexual assault that was not motivated

BULLYING INST. (2010), http://www.workplacebullying.org/multi/pdf/gender
_2010_wbi.pdf. Although Justice Scalia made clear in Oncale that general
workplace bullying does not constitute sexual harassment for purposes of a Title
VII claim, 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), often bullying and sexual harassment overlap.
What is perceived as bullying may actually be sexual harassment. See Axam &
Zalesne, supra note 127; infra Part V.F. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
some of those reported instances of workplace bullying actually constituted maleon-male or female-on-female sexual harassment. Same-sex sexual harassment thus
may be more common than people realize.
191. The facts of each case must determine the proper analysis, but the
author argues that this situation will not always fit into either of the categories.
This kind of harassment does not necessary reflect a general hostility toward
women in the workplace. This theory appears even less likely if one accepts Dr.
Peggy Drexler’s theory that women sometimes bully other women out of a sense of
competition. See Drexler, supra note 189. If a woman harasses another woman
based on a belief that she is more qualified for a position or promotion or other
workplace benefit, she obviously believes that women are qualified for that
workplace benefit. Finally, as with other cases examined in this note, the third
category often hinges on whether comparative evidence is available. In a femaledominated workplace, comparative evidence may be difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain.
192. For example, in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
2002), the court ruled that physical sexual assault automatically constituted
harassment under Title VII. See also 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
LITIGATION § 5:42 n.20 (2013) (“The most extreme form of offensive physical,
sexual conduct—rape—clearly violates Title VII.”).
193. 265 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended and superseded on denial
of reh’g, 301 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421,
1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Just as every murder is also a battery, every rape committed
in the employment setting is also discrimination based on the employee's sex.”).
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by any of the three enumerated evidentiary routes would not be
194
actionable under Title VII.
While it may be true that not every instance of vulgarity in a
workplace amounts to actionable sexual harassment, the complex
gender dynamics and power structures in a typical office allow
discrimination on the basis of sex to manifest itself in several
different ways. This is precisely why the three evidentiary routes in
Oncale cannot be interpreted as exhaustive, and this is why Oncale
emphasized that a court should consider “all the circumstances”
195
surrounding a same-sex Title VII claim.
F.

Recommendations
196

In EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction Co., Judge Grady Jolly, in his
dissenting opinion, expressed his concern over proving more
197
abstract theories of sexual harassment. This concern may be
legitimate, because, for example, proving that an aggressor was
sexually interested in a harassed employee may be easier than
proving that he or she acted to maintain power hierarchies in the
198
workplace. This is especially true because an aggressor might not
194. See, e.g., Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir.
2012) (denying the plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment despite the fact that he
was prodded in the rear by a hammer and a long sucker rod); Smith v. Hy-Vee,
Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 905 (8th Cir. 2010) (denying the plaintiff’s claim despite the
fact that the plaintiff was repeatedly groped by the aggressor).
195. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
196. 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013).
197. See id. at 471 (Jolly, J., dissenting)
But regardless of whether there are other methods for making this
determination, the EEOC proffered no basis for inferring
discriminatory intent based upon Woods's sex—subjective or objective.
Rather, it moves quickly from asserting that other evidentiary paths are
available to a conclusion that, because Wolfe targeted certain words
and acts at Woods, Wolfe's mal intent to sexually discriminate against
Woods was proved. This line of reasoning completely abdicates the
burden prescribed to plaintiffs in same-sex sexual discrimination cases
by the Supreme Court in Oncale—which is not simply to assert the basis
for the inference of harassment based upon sex, but to further prove
the truth of that assertion.
Id.
198. See Clarke, supra note 152, at 536 (“Although the Supreme Court held
that ‘harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex,’ in practice, it has been difficult for
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consciously recognize that he or she is attempting to maintain
gender dynamics.
However, there are methods for proving these more abstract
theories of sexual harassment. For example, an attorney could have
199
used the negative reactions of Wasek’s supervisors
and the
increased harassment that Wasek experienced after he struggled
200
with some heavy equipment to argue that Wasek was harassed for
not conforming to a dominant and aggressive male stereotype.
Courts need to have an open mind when accepting this evidence,
but attorneys and organizations like the EEOC also need to think
outside of the Oncale box. Additionally, human resource representatives and sexual harassment investigators need to be aware of
these potential theories of sexual harassment so that they can
gather the right evidence and conduct witness interviews effectively.
Another ever-present concern in sexual harassment law is that
broadening the definition of “because of sex” will lead to a flood of
201
frivolous Title VII cases. After all, at the time of the Oncale
decision, sexual harassment was the fastest growing area of
202
employment discrimination. It is worth noting, however, that the
number of sexual harassment claims filed has actually decreased in
203
recent years.
Additionally, limiting the number of sexual harassment claims
by narrowly defining “because of sex” excludes many instances of
204
legitimate sexual harassment. As noted above, “because of sex”
plaintiffs to establish causation based on any other theory.” (citations omitted)).
199. See Wasek, 682 F.3d at 467.
200. Id. at 465.
201. For example, in Oncale, Justice Scalia noted that Title VII is not “a
general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
202. Schultz, supra note 137, at 1686 n.6 (citing Kirstin Downey Grimsley,
Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily; New Laws Boost Hopes for Monetary Awards, WASH.
POST, May 12, 1997, at A1, available at 1997 WLNR 7183487) (noting the increase
in sexual harassment complaints from 6127 complaints in 1990 to 15,342
complaints in 1996).
203. The number of sexual harassment claims filed with the EEOC and state
and local Fair Employment Practices agencies in the United States declined from
15,889 in fiscal year 1997 to 11,364 in fiscal year 2011. Sexual Harassment
Charges, EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997–FY 2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual
_harassment.cfm (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
204. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 176 (“Accordingly, it is apparent

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 12

1644

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:4

205

could mean conduct motivated by sexual desire, animosity toward
206
207
a person’s biological sex, animosity toward a person’s gender,
208
or simply conduct that is inherently sexual. This broad meaning
cannot be encompassed by the three Oncale evidentiary routes.
Rather than limiting the abstract category of “because of sex”
through an exhaustive interpretation of the Oncale list of
evidentiary routes, courts should place limitations on cases based
on the requirements that harassment be severe, pervasive, and
unwelcome, and that there exists some basis for imputing liability
209
to an employer. In Oncale, for example, Justice Scalia notes how
courts need to draw distinctions between discriminatory employ210
ment conditions and “ordinary socializing in the workplace.” It is
worth noting, however, that although courts should place limits on
conduct that is not sufficiently severe, a narrow view of the severe
and pervasive requirement may also have dangerous results.
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on horseplay in the Oncale context
seems questionable given the egregious behavior that took place in
that case. This is due to the fact that Oncale did not involve “mild
insults, distasteful jokes, or sporadic incidents of questionable
offensiveness,” but instead involved a “relentless pattern of explicit
threats of rape, culminating in physical assaults in which multiple
harassers restrained Oncale, forced him into contact with another
man’s penis, and subjected him to forcible anal penetration with a
foreign object amidst threats of anal rape.” The danger of Scalia’s
statement in this context is that it has caused courts to
mischaracterize legitimate same-sex sexual harassment as “mere
211
horseplay.” In Wasek, where the plaintiff was subjected to sexually

that the cases analyzing sexual harassment directed at women have not adhered to
a rigid, simplistic conception of ‘sex’ in assessing whether the conduct could be
characterized as conduct that occurred ‘because of’ the plaintiff's ‘sex’ within the
meaning of Title VII.”).
205. See supra Part V.B.
206. See supra Part V.B.
207. See supra Part V.B.
208. See supra Part V.C.
209. Bates, supra note 25, at 146–47.
210. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
211. See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 224 (“Numerous other same-sex
sexual harassment cases have involved closely analogous examples of physical
sexual assault and forcible simulations of oral or anal sodomy that were
perpetrated by one or more harassers as part of a pattern of incessant verbal and
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assaultive conduct similar to the conduct in Oncale, the court
noted how “the conduct of jerks, bullies, and persecutors is simply
not actionable under Title VII unless they are acting because of the
213
victim’s gender.”
Thus, while the requirements for sexual harassment should be
used to limit frivolous cases, viewing any category too narrowly
could exclude legitimate sex-based discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The complicated nature of gender discrimination and the
relatively short history of sexual harassment claims have led to
judicial inconsistency. Courts have been especially inconsistent with
same-sex sexual harassment claims because on one hand, they have
felt increasing pressure from society to expand the definition of
214
sexual harassment, and on the other hand, they have felt the
need to narrow the definition to keep certain “trivial” claims out of
215
the court system. However, when judges confine themselves to
narrow definitions of sexual harassment, certain individuals are
unjustly precluded from bringing Title VII claims. Yet gender
discrimination is too complicated for such narrow definitions. If
society truly wants to eradicate workplace discrimination, our
justice system needs to adequately address the complexities of the
power hierarchies of the office environment.

physical abuse that would not be not easily confused with ‘ordinary socializing’ or
‘horseplay.’”).
212. In Wasek, the plaintiff was poked in the rear with a hammer and a long
sucker rod. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2012).
213. Id. at 467.
214. For example, at the time this article was written, Congress was debating
passage of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would
prohibit employment discrimination “based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.” Support for increasing who is covered under sexual harassment claims
can be inferred from the advocates for these new protections. See Sylvia Ann
Hewlett, ENDA Vote Is Just the Beginning, HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 2013 4:09 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sylvia-ann-hewlett/enda-vote-is-just-the-beginning
_b_3613199.html.
215. See supra Part V.F.
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